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A First Amendment for Second Life:
What Virtual Worlds Mean for the
Law of Video Games
Marc Jonathan Blitz*
ABSTRACT
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, video games have
finally taken their place alongside movies, comic books, and drawings
as a form of protected First Amendment speech. Since the Seventh
Circuit's 2001 decision in American Amusement Machine Association
v. Kendrick, court after court has struck down ordinances and statutes
aimed at restricting violent video games - on the grounds that such
violate game designers' and players' First Amendment speech rights.
This series of rulings marks a stark change from courts' previous
stance on video games, which consigned them to the same realm of
unprotected non-speech conduct as games like tennis, chess, or
checkers. Video games were able to escape from this unprotected
realm-and become First Amendment expression-largely because
advances in computer graphics and design made them more and more
like interactive movies and television shows, and less and less like
digitized board games and pinball machines.
J.D., University of Chicago, 2001; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 2001; B.A.,
Harvard University, 1989. Thanks to Steven Hetcher, Christopher Yoo, Lisa P. Ramsey,
and the many other scholars who commented on the issues I discuss in this piece at the
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Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks also to Sara Beth Myers, Casey Fiesler,
Nicholas Lynton, Steven Reilly, Ed Wenger, Carrie Frondorf, Hannah Smith, and Michael
Mahone for their hard work in editing this piece and preparing it for publication.
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But instead of simply forging ahead in this jurisprudential
evolution, as video games evolve from personal forms of recreation to
virtual worlds, this Article suggests that virtual worlds should make
us rethink the First Amendment theory that got us to this point. This
is because, while video games may have become First Amendment
speech by becoming intricate movie-like stories, many virtual worlds
are decidedly not scripted stories. They are rather stages for a
multitude of expressive activity, some of which is an electronic
analogue of the chess-playing, tennis-playing, car racing, or aimless
lounging and wandering, that the courts excluded from the realm of
First Amendment speech in an earlier era. This Article argues that
this exclusion was a mistake. Virtual worlds are realms of First
Amendment expression not because of the stories and role play they
make possible, but rather because they provide a setting for giving form
to imagination in sounds and imagery, a setting that can be walled off
from the business of civil government and thus reserved for more
unconstrained exercises of individual freedom. Stories and messages
are an optional part of this setting and are not a necessary ingredient
of First Amendment speech. This is not to say that government has no
role to play in regulating virtual worlds: where individuals bring
harm-threatening activity into virtual worlds involving acts that abuse
others' money or reputation, for example, government might have to
regulate such worlds. But such regulation must take place alongside
of, and not simply displace, the First Amendment's application to
virtual worlds.
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"You don't have to have a point to have a point."
- The Point
2
In the science fiction novel Ender's Game,3 the protagonist, a
child named Ender, plays a video game with some rather unusual
characteristics. The game Ender plays is not entirely different from
the video games that garner media attention today and that have
given rise to litigation and proposed legislation to restrict their use by
minors. Like many games that are popular with young Americans,
this one has violent encounters; for example, Ender gouges out the
eyes of his monstrous opponent.4 However, it differs from regular
video games in two important respects. First, typical video games end
when the player overcomes the last hurdle and achieves victory;
Ender's game, however, does not reach an apex, but rather persists in
a seemingly taskless environment. Even with no more missions left to
achieve or points to collect, the game world lives on in an electronic
realm that exists to be explored and understood. 5 The second way in
1. THE GAME (Polygram Filmed Entertainment 1997).
2. THE POINT (Murakami-Wolf Productions 1971).
3. ORSON ScoTT CARD, ENDER'S GAME (Tor 1991) (1977).
4. Id. at 47.
5. Id. at 54 (describing Ender's arrival at a stage of the video game called the "End
of the World" and his musing that "[p]erhaps it's called the end of the world because it's the
end of the games, because I can go to one of the villages and become one of the little boys
working and playing there, with nothing to kill and nothing to kill me, just living there").
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which Ender's game differs from real-world video games is that the
electronic interface on which Ender "plays" spills over into the
physical world inhabited by Ender, his family, his colleagues, and
many others. 6 Far from simply providing entertainment for the
player, the computer actually spies on (and enables others to spy on)
him, gathering information from far-away databases to incorporate
into the game.
7
These two idiosyncratic qualities of Ender's video game nicely
highlight a challenge that emerging virtual worlds like Second Life
pose to First Amendment jurisprudence. Courts have only recently
begun to gather their bearings in video game cases, such as those
dealing with restrictions on violent games. Beginning with American
Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick,8 a case from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 2001, federal courts began
to abandon their previous refusals to treat video games as First
Amendment speech. At issue in the case was the constitutionality of
an Indianapolis ordinance that aimed to limit minors' access to video
games containing "graphic violence."9  The ordinance required video
game arcade operators to place these games (as well as any with
"strong sexual content") in a separate partitioned area of the arcade,
and to make them off-limits to any "minor unaccompanied by a parent,
guardian, or other custodian."10 Previous cases had generally found
that arcade games were no more deserving of being called First
Amendment "speech" than the playing of tennis or baseball.11 But the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Kendrick broke with that consensus, and
set the stage for a new one. Since Kendrick, numerous other courts
have found that many, if not all, video games constitute protected
expression under the First Amendment's free speech clause1 2 and have
Ender eventually finds that there are some additional challenges that arise, although they
are challenges with a very different purpose and nature than those in a typical video game.
6. Id. at 296-97.
7. Id.
8. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
9. Id. at 573.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep't of
Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that video games, like baseball and
chess, are outside the scope of the First Amendment).
12. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d
954 (8th Cir. 2003); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); Video
Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 6, 2007); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006); Entm't
Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v.
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
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required state legislators to overcome a much higher hurdle in
restricting these games' production, sale, or availability-a hurdle
which they have generally failed to overcome.
13
It is likely that if video games played on Playstation 3, Wii, and
Xbox consoles-to name just a few-are protected by the First
Amendment (at least when played in the United States), then so too
will be massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs)
like Second Life and World of Warcraft, where millions of gamers come
together in online worlds to interact, compete, and jointly build
settings to live out virtual fantasy lives. Thus, if legislators and other
officials in the United States extend their concerns about online sex
and violence to cover MMORPGs,' 4 they will likely encounter First
Amendment barriers.
But virtual worlds may complicate the analysis that courts
have provided for typical video games. The most prominent legal
justification for granting video games First Amendment status is that,
unlike unprotected non-speech sporting or gaming activities in the
physical world-such as tennis, bowling, or backgammon-video
games are not merely games but also stories, essentially interactive
forms of the graphic novel. Thus, Judge Posner once noted that
"[m]ost of the video games in the record of this case, games that the
City believes violate its ordinances, are stories."'15 He added that the
themes of games like House of the Dead--"[s]elf-defense, protection of
others, dread of the 'undead,' fighting against overwhelming odds ...
are all age-old themes of literature .... ."16 He hinted that video games
lacking such a story may, by contrast, be unprotected by the First
404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp.
2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
13. See. e.g., Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 649-50 ("The issue of regulating violent
video games to minors has been decided in the Seventh and Eighth Circuit, both of which
have found that the attempted regulation in those districts violates the First Amendment.
Several other District Courts have similarly held such acts to be unconstitutional.")
(internal citations omitted).
14. Such concerns have recently been expressed by a committee of the European
Parliament, which- instead of recommending bans on any specific kind of MMORPG
content-insisted that technology could increase parental control over what minors see. See
Video Games: A Red Button for Parents, http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/news/expertinfopress-page/063-48809-040-02-07-911-200902091PR48788-09-02-2009-
2009-false/default.sv.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) ("Members of the committee are
particularly worried about on-line games, which are easy to download onto a PC or a
mobile phone, making parental control harder. Until [Pan-European Game Information]
online is up and running, the report proposes fitting consoles, computers, or other game
devices with a 'red button' to give parents the chance to disable a game or control access at
certain times.").
15. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577.
16. Id. at 577-78.
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Amendment.17 And certain courts and scholars have built upon this
hint, suggesting that there is an important distinction to be drawn
between video games that are essentially interactive movies or
graphic novels (which receive First Amendment protection) and those
that are merely traditional games, like pinball or baseball, recast in
electronic form (where they receive no more First Amendment
protection than they do in their original form).18
But some virtual worlds-and other computer-generated visual
media-do not necessarily provide a setting for role playing or drama;
instead they provide an outlet for users to simply wander around and
experiment in an unstructured, goal-free environment. In Second
Life, for example, your virtual self (or "avatar") can spend the day
floating over a city, lying on a beach staring at computer-generated
waves, or tinkering with a newly purchased car or spaceship. 19 And,
in what presents the most likely target for legislation-when avatars
engage in simulations of sexual activity, violence, or some combination
thereof-they need not do so as part of a script or story. On the
contrary, Second Life's creators provide no narrative or mission. Any
such narrative must be supplied by Second Life's users, who can also
opt to enjoy its simulation capacities without weaving them into a
script of any kind.
It is not only virtual worlds like Second Life that raise such
questions, but also numerous other types of electronic media: people
17. Id. at 579-80; See infra text accompanying notes 65-76.
18. See e.g., Michael T. Morley, "Exceedingly Vexed and Difficult". Games and the
First Amendment, 112 YALE L.J. 361, 366 (2002) ("The courts' treatment of video games
offers an interesting insight into the constitutional status of traditional games. Those video
games that are essentially 'digitized' versions of traditional games have been ruled to lack
sufficient communicative features to warrant constitutional protection, precisely because
the underlying traditional games they represent are not forms of expression. On the other
hand, video games with story lines that convey information or ideas are closely akin to
constitutionally protected books and movies--media that are inherently communicative--
and so fall under the First Amendment. Simply being a game is not sufficient to bring
either traditional games, or video games, under the Constitution's protection.").
19. See MICHAEL RYMAszESWKI ET AL., SECOND LIFE: THE OFFICIAL GUIDE 5-6, 11
(2d ed. 2008). Second Life is by no means the only such virtual space allowing for
unstructured play, exploration, or experimentation. Similar open virtual expanses, where
the object is to live one's life rather than achieve a given mission can be found in worlds
like The Sims Online. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual
Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) (describing The Sims Online Community, Blazing Falls,
where individuals perform chores like "taking out the garbage, washing the dishes, and
paying for parties and furniture" and "in their leisure time, they chat with neighbors,
attend shows, dance at nightclubs, work out, and visit local attractions." As Lastowka and
Hunter note, this "a new concept in games, if it is even properly characterized as a game at
all." See also EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS 10-11 (2005) (noting that virtual
worlds allow for much more than role playing and "allow such a huge number of players,
and such an unscripted plot, that the line between acting and mere living vanishes.").
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play chess and checkers and bowl on computers and cell phones. 20
They also play games that involve manipulating colored tiles 21 or
building new types of species. 22 Moreover, they make use not only of
the graphical creations of professional programmers, but also of the
user-generated content now found in innumerable games, computer
icons, ringtones, animations, and computer sound clips. They create
their own soundscapes on the musical video-game Electroplankton,23
and on virtual keyboards on iPhones and laptops and in virtual
worlds. They rack up points and set off light and sound shows as they
play Pinbrawl on the web 24 or iPinball on their iPhones.25 What is the
First Amendment status of this non-narrative virtual activity? If, as
one court has suggested, story-based video games are protected, but
not those that "are merely digitized pinball machines," 26 then what
about Pinbrawl, iPinball, and other story and communication-free
forms of electronic imagery, including those found within virtual
worlds?
This Article argues that these should be staunchly protected.
Narrative or no narrative, message or no message-the qualities that
entitle video games to First Amendment protection have been there all
along, and predate the current age of movie-like, adventure-based
video games. These qualities can be found even in older arcade games
like Pong or Pacman, where players respectively play electronic tennis
with lines and dots or chase a smiley face through a maze. These
games, like virtual worlds today, generate imagery, animation, music,
20. See e.g., Karpov Chess for Cell Phones, http://www.gamespot.com/mobile
/puzzle/karpovchess/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); Play Checkers on AOL Games,
http://games.aol.com/game/checkers/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); Pro Bowling for Cell
Phones, http://www.gamespot.com/mobile/sports/probowling/index.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2009); Touch Chess with iChess, http://www.touchtip.com/iphone-and-ipod-touch/touch-
chess-with-ichess/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
21. See, e.g., Swain Valasek, Quadrum: Colors Review, IPHONE APPs REVIEWS, Feb.
7, 2009, http://www.iphoneappreviews.net/2009/02/07/quadrumcolors/; Bejeweled Review,
http://pc.gamezone.com/gzreviews/r17327.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
22. See Tracy Erickson, Spore Origins iPhone, POCKET GAMER.CO.UK, Sept. 10,
2008, http://www.pocketgamer.co.uk/r/iPhone/Spore+Origins+(iPhone)/review.asp?c=8844.
However, one might plausibly argue that Spore does contain a narrative, albeit one a little
different from that of many other video games, in that it allows one to progress from one
stage of evolution to another. See id.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
24. See Pinbrawl, http://www.thepinballzone.net/playGame.php?id=52 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009).
25. See iPinball: Fantastic Physics Addon for Your Apple iPhone,
http://iphonegap.com/2008/01/19/ipinball-fantastic-iphysics-addon-for-your-apple-iphone/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009); see also Youtube - Demonstration of iPinball,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-9yd2h3GE9LQ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
26. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002).
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or other aural landscapes, and that should be enough to make them
presumptively a kind of artistic endeavor. Thus, an act in a video
game or virtual world should be presumptively protected speech even
absent the elements of a traditional story or drama: not just moving a
human-looking avatar or guiding a spaceship, but also simply moving
a white square across a slightly darker white background. No one
would question that Kasimir Malevich's famous painting White on
White27 would be just as much a protected form of expression under
the First Amendment as Francisco de Goya's realistic depictions of
bullfights, 28 and the same should be true where the abstract visions
occur in computer animation rather than a painting, or when they are
created by casual users dabbling in the realm of expression rather
than dedicated and trained professionals and craftsmen.
First Amendment protection should apply to creative acts in
virtual worlds not because they carry messages, stories, or dramatic
enactments, but for two more basic reasons: first, because, with or
without stories, acts in virtual worlds embody and give form to
imagined perceptions or experiences; and, second, because the
electronic and visual medium that gives form to users' internal visions
is by its nature generally separated from the realm that John Locke
called the "business of civil government."29 The images and sounds on
a computer monitor or cell phone screen can be seen and heard, and
they can generate emotional and other internal responses from us, but
they cannot typically reach into our lives and reshape our physical
environment, subject us to physical injury, or cause gains or losses in
resources. These environments should thus remain presumptively
free from control or limitation by government. And the game
designers who create and revise such environments should not be seen
as performing the business of government (as some commentators
appear to advocate when arguing that these environments are like
27. See Ricki Sapolich, When Less Isn't More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral
Rights Model of Copyright Through a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 459 (2007)
(noting Malevich is "infamous for White on White, which consists of a white square on a
white canvas"); see also Kazimir Malevich, White on White, http://www.bc.edu/bcorg
/avp/cas/fnartlart/2Othlpainting/malevichl.jpg [hereinafter Kazimir Malevich, White on
White].
28. See Kazimir Malevich, Suprematist Composition: White on White, supra note
27. See also Spanish Painting from El Greco to Picasso: Time, Truth, and History, Blood
and Sand, Guggenheim Arts Curriculum, at http://artscurriculum.guggenheim.org
/lessons/spanish.L3.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (noting that Goya "drew and painted
bullfighting throughout his life" and "captured both the brutality and the energy of this
real-life event.").
29. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 19 (Prometheus 1990)
(1689).
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company towns run by quasi-government entities).30 Indeed, it is not
only digitized versions of arcade games like electronic pinball, or board
games like chess and checkers, that should be the First Amendment
beneficiaries of the new light cast by virtual worlds and user-
generated content on the realm of video games, but also the more old-
fashioned versions of these games that one finds in mechanical devices
or cardboard and plastic-for there is little basis for distinguishing
them from their electronic equivalents. One of the most interesting
First Amendment lessons of gaming's future then is what it says about
the constitutional status of gaming's past. This is the major First
Amendment lesson that can be drawn out of the law's encounters with
virtual worlds.
But this argument would seem drastically incomplete if it did
not acknowledge a key complication in extending such broad First
Amendment protection to virtual world environments and
experiences: emerging virtual worlds not only resemble the strange
computer activity in Ender's Game by being storyless, but also by
being borderless. Second Life and other virtual worlds are often
unmoored to any specific plot. They are free of the limitations that
would ordinarily wall off a digital fantasy world from the physical
realm where people socialize, work, learn, and buy things. For
example, virtual worlds allow employees of a business to begin a
conference call in the real world, but then continue it in a virtual
world where their avatars can not only exchange suggestions, but also
explore business-related 3D models.31 Moreover, someone in the real
world might trade a real item of value for virtual-world currency (like
"Linden dollars" in Second Life) that can only be used in virtual
worlds.3 2
One might thus anticipate that virtual worlds like Second Life
will link to activities that people engage in on sites for commercial
exchange, like eBay, PayPal, or Craigslist, 33 or for recreation and
30. See infra text accompanying notes 145-49.
31. Cf. Kermit Pattison, Why You Should Have Your Next Business Meeting in
Second Life, FASTCOMPANY.CoM, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.fastcompany.com/articles
/2008/08/interview-philip-rosedale.html ("Second Life, the virtual reality site, is reaching
out to a new audience: businesses. [Second Life] is seeing an uptick in traffic for business
meetings, conference calls and classes .... ).
32. See RYMASZEWSKI, supra note 19, at 9 ("Second Life has its own currency: the
Linden dollar. Linden dollars are exchangeable for real-life dollars.").
33. Craigslist, http://www.craigslist.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); eBay,
http://www.ebay.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); PayPal, http://www.paypal.com (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009).
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social exchange, like Facebook or Digg.34 As Jack Balkin writes,
"virtual worlds platforms will be adopted for commerce, for education,
for professional, military, and vocational training, for medical
consultation and psychotherapy, and even for social and economic
experimentation to test how social norms develop."35 As Dan Hunter
and Gregory Lastowka write, "economic boundaries between the real
and the virtual world are not as distinct as they might appear," as
"[y]our nonvirtual credit card will be charged" for purchases of virtual
items.3 6 And as Joshua Fairfield likewise writes in this issue of the
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, there is no
''magic circle" that preserves virtual worlds for pure play and
expression and protects them "from outside influences-law, real-
world economics, real-world money, and the like."37 These things are
obviously part of the "business of civil government," so how can one
maintain-as this article will-that the virtual imagery and
experiences should be placed beyond the government's reach by First
Amendment limits? The answer suggested in this analysis is that the
sound and imagery of virtual worlds must mix with something else-
generally, something that can cause a certain kind of harm to person
or property-before it can become subject to legal restriction or
regulation. Such mixing may well become a pervasive part of life in
MMORPGs and other virtual worlds. But we should be slow to
presume it has taken place absent evidence of harm (or threats of
harm) to people or property, and should not suspend First Amendment
protections for graphical art and imagery simply on the grounds that
particular electronic images or soundscapes lack a narrative, a
message, or other indicia of more familiar forms of First Amendment
speech.
Part I sets out the argument for why First Amendment
protection should apply to virtual worlds and free-form video games,
and probably to much structured or unstructured creative activity
that happens in physical space as well. Although courts sometimes
suggest that it is the stories or messages within video games that
make them First Amendment speech, this suggestion is an erroneous
one. This Part considers some possible counterarguments that courts
34. Digg, http://www.digg.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
35. Jack Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2044 (2004).
36. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 10 (2004).
37. Joshua Fairfield, The Magic Circle, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 823, 824
(2009).
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or scholars might invoke to justify drawing a constitutional line
between video games with a message or narrative, and those that lack
one. Part II then looks at a possible complications in extending broad
First Amendment shielding to emerging video game play in virtual
worlds: the possibility that in doing so, courts will be stopping
government authorities not only from restricting artistic expression,
but regulating financial and social transactions where people need
protection from harm. It focuses specifically on the example of privacy
protection and briefly considers the question of how First Amendment
protection for virtual world activity might affect privacy protection
from virtual world surveillance and spying.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FOR VIRTUAL WORLDS AND VIDEO GAMES
There was a red-haired man who had no eyes or ears.
Neither did he have any hair, so he was called red-haired theoretically.
He couldn't speak, since he didn't have a mouth. Neither did he have a nose.
He didn't even have any arms or legs. He had no stomach and he had no back and
he had no spine and he had no innards whatsoever. He had nothing at all!
Therefore there's no knowing whom we are even talking about.
In fact it's better that we don't say any more about him.
- Daniil Ivanovich Kharms, 'The Red-Haired Man" (1937)38
The art of the past which stood, at least ostensibly, in the service of religion and
the state, will take on new life in... pure (unapplied) art ....
No more "likenesses of reality," no idealistic images nothing but a desert!
But this desert is filled with the spirit of nonobjective sensation which pervades
everything.
- Kasimir Malevich, Suprematism (1927)39
In the television show Seinfeld, the character George Costanza
famously tries to convince a confused network executive to produce "a
38. Daniil Ivanovich Kharms, The Red-Haired Man, OLD POETRY,
http://oldpoetry.com/opoem/28748-Daniil-Ivanovich-Kharms-The-Red-Haired-Man.
39. KASIMIR MALEVICH, THE NON-OBJECTIVE WORLD: THE MANIFESTO OF
SUPREMATISM (2003).
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show about nothing."40 When others try to salvage the idea by offering
premises for the show, Costanza vehemently refuses to compromise
his "artistic integrity."41 The notion of a show without any plot or
storyline-without any challenge to be met or obstacles to overcome-
was intended as a joke; after all, Seinfeld itself is often described as "a
show about nothing." There are some Seinfeld episodes dedicated
entirely to the characters' trivial daily frustrations, such as a long
wait for a table at a restaurant,42 or their search for a car in a parking
garage. 43 But there are some dramatic works that do not even rely on
a minimal plot, but dispense with a story entirely. Indeed, there are
influential movies that not only lack plots or stories, but characters:
the dancing colors and shapes in the animations of German
experimental filmmakers such as Walter Ruttman, Hans Richter,
Viking Eggeling, and Oskar Fischinger, 44 for example, or of American
animator Harry Everett Smith.
45
There is little doubt that even these plot- and character-free
films constitute protected expression under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court said as much when it noted that the First
Amendment "unquestionably shield[s the] painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Arnold Schoenberg, [and] Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll."46 In doing so, the Court put aside (or at least, recognized an
exception to) the rule it had previously articulated in Spence v.
Washington (often referred to as "the Spence test"47): the rule that a
40. See Seinfeld: The Pitch (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 1992), transcript
available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/ThePitch.htm.
41. See id.
42. See Seinfeld: The Chinese Restaurant (NBC television broadcast May 23, 1991),
transcript available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheChineseRestaurant.htm.
43. See Seinfeld: The Parking Garage (NBC television broadcast Oct. 30, 1991),
transcript available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheParkingGarage.htm.
44. See Cindy Keefer, "Space Light Art" - Early Abstract Cinema and Multimedia,
1900-1959, CENTER FOR VISUAL MusIc, http://www.centerforvisualmusic.org
/CKSLAexc.htm (describing developments that "led to the abstract or 'absolute' films of
Viking Eggeling, Walther Ruttman, Hans Richter, and Oskar Fischinger"); Esther Leslie,
Where Abstraction and Comics Collide, TATE ETC. (Summer 2006), available at
http://www.tate.org.uk/tateetc/issue7/fischinger.htm ("In the 1920s Ruttmann, Richter and
others threw away their canvases in favour of pictures that moved: multiple Mondrians a
second."); see also Leslie, supra note 44 (describing an Oskar Fischinger film, Allegretto, as
"animated Kandinsky").
45. See Harry Smith Archives, http://www.harrysmitharchives.com/l-bio/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009).
46. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995).
47. See, e.g., See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1251 (1995) (noting that criteria offered in Spence for determining if certain
activity counts as speech is "known as the Spence test.").
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discernable message must be present for non-verbal conduct to count
as First Amendment "speech."48  One cannot find such a verbal
message in music, or non-representational art, or in the parade at
issue in Hurley itself. But the Court nonetheless held that such
abstract artistic and cultural expression counts as First Amendment
"speech."49
This language from the Court has significant implications for
the First Amendment status of many virtual worlds and other new
forms of computer-generated visual media that provide raw material
for the exercise of creativity. While there is no mission that must be
completed or task that must be undertaken in Second Life, and while
one can spend one's day lounging at a virtual beach or floating above a
landscape of geometric forms, this hardly disqualifies these virtual
activities from the scope of the First Amendment. The First
Amendment's free speech protection should likewise extend to the
Second Life computer "scripts" that users can write (or obtain) for
making objects move-regardless of whether that movement consists
of a black cube moving against a white background or a simulation of
the sexual gyration that Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized (in
describing nude dancing that occurs in physical rather than virtual
space) as falling within "the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment."
50
A. The Scope of Judicial Protection for Video Games:
Courts'Approaches to First Amendment Protection of Games
Considering this, much of the effort that courts have made to
justify finding video games as First Amendment speech, while correct,
was redundant. As noted earlier, federal courts have gone to great
lengths since 2001 to point out that modern-day video games are
developing a closer and closer resemblance to films and graphic
novels: their graphics are impressively realistic and the sequence of
adventures is based on increasingly intricate scripts.5 1 Paving the
way for video game protection, Judge Posner pointed out in Kendrick
that the games at issue were stories, many of which conveyed themes
48. 418 U.S. 405, 405, 410-11, 415 (1974) (holding that displaying a flag upside
down with a peace symbol constituted symbolic expression where "[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was presento and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it").
49. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
50. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
plurality).
51. See supra notes 12-13, 15-18 and accompanying text.
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common to literature. 52 Other courts have repeated this theme. For
example, the district court in Entertainment Software Association v.
Blagojevich emphasized that video games "most resemble films and
television shows by telling stories through pictures, text, and sound."
5 3
Likewise, the district court in Video Software Dealers Association v.
Maleng stressed that "[the] games at issue in this litigation . . .
frequently involve intricate ... story lines."5 4 And scholars defending
these holdings, such as Paul Salamanca,55 Gregory Laughlin, 56 Clay
Calvert,57 and Robert Richards, 58 have pointed out the many examples
of video games that contain developed characters, intricate plotlines,
educational functions, and/or social and political messages. These
arguments have value in that they make it hard for courts to deny
First Amendment protection to many modern-day video games.
However, these same arguments also obscure the more
important characteristic of video games that makes them count as
First Amendment speech: the outlet that they provide for exercises of
imagination (by both creators and players) through the creation of
pure sound and imagery. As Paul Salamanca observes, in his defense
of extending First Amendment protection to video games, they are
thus part of the territory where individuals can exercise freedom in
the realm of fantasy that they cannot exercise in the highly regulated
real world where social needs must be met and social conflict
52. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2001).
53. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
54. 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
55. See Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games as a Protected Form of Expression, 40 GA.
L. REV. 153, 169 (2005) ("Today, video games bear a close resemblance to motion pictures,
and many people would probably be surprised if the First Amendment did not protect them
as a form of expression. But to give courts like the Caswell court [which previously denied
such protection to video games] their due, video games in the early 1980s were somewhat
limited in their technological capabilities."). As noted below, infra text accompanying note
59, Salamanca also offers a broader framework for extending the First Amendment to video
games, focusing not simply on narrative but on these games' aesthetic qualities, and on the
medium's technological potential. See id. at 170-71, 189.
56. See generally Gregory K. Laughlin, Playing Games with the First Amendment:
Are Video Games Speech and May Minors' Access to Graphically Violent Video Games Be
Restricted?, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 481, 510-518 (2006); describing numerous video games that
"have the explicit and primary goal of communicating a particularized message to the
gamers who play them," and providing examples of games with political and religious
messages and educational uses). Id. at 510 (noting that video game creation often involves
"extensive plot and character development.").
57. See Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to
the Defense of Kids' Culture and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2002)
(quoting Judge Posner's language in Kendrick relating video games to fairy tales and other
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adjudicated by government authority.59  He observed that while
"[p]eople cannot generally slaughter cattle in their backyards[, t]hey
can, however, live expansive lives of fantasy constructed almost
entirely with ink, oil, or bytes."60 In other words, if, as Jed Rubenfeld
argues, it is "First Amendment bedrock" that "[i]magination ought to
be free,"61 then video games-and many new virtual spaces that allow
individuals to manipulate, or immerse themselves in, computer
imagery-provide one setting where imagination can be free, with or
without a narrative or goal to organize it.
At least one of the federal courts extending First Amendment
protection to video games has strongly suggested as much: quoting the
Supreme Court's statement in Hurley that the First Amendment
unquestionably protects abstract, non-representational art, explaining
"we see no reason why the pictures, graphic design, concept art,
sounds, music, stories, and narrative present in video games are not
entitled to a similar protection."62  As this language shows, some
courts that take note of the narrative qualities of modern video games
have also noticed the artistic elements in these video games that
justify First Amendment protection even in the absence of a narrative.
Another such example is found in the Maleng court's recognition that
video games not only contain stories but also "detailed artwork."63
Statements of this sort cut strongly against earlier court
decisions denying First Amendment protection to older "arcade-style"
video games like Pacman.64 Still, courts in more recent cases have
been reluctant to expressly disavow the earlier holdings. On the
contrary, even as they have extended First Amendment protection to
the complex dramas and impressive graphics of modern video games,
they have strongly suggested that many of the more primitive "first-
person shooter" games might remain unprotected.
59. See Salamanca, supra note 55 at 198.
60. Id.
61. Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 37 (2002).
62. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 957
(8th Cir. 2003).
63. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
64. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep't of
Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("In no sense can it be said that video games
are meant to inform. Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game
of baseball, is pure entertainment with no informational element."); Caswell v. Licensing
Comm'n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983) ("From the record before us, it
appears that any communication or expression of ideas that occurs during the playing of a
video game is purely inconsequential.").
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One of the more recent decisions, Wilson v. Midway Games,
Inc.,65 for example, attempted to reconcile these earlier cases with the
newer rulings protecting video games by suggesting that there is an
important First Amendment distinction to be drawn between those
games that "are merely digitized pinball machines [and] are not
protected speech" and "those that are analytically indistinguishable
from other protected media, such as motion pictures or books, which
convey information or evoke emotions by imagery, [and] are protected
under the First Amendment."66 This is by no means the only decision
suggesting that some games-or game activity-may fall outside the
scope of the First Amendment, even if those with elaborate storylines
fall within it. As mentioned earlier, the district court in Maleng found
that unlike modern-day, adventure-based games, "early generations of
video games may have lacked the requisite expressive element, being
little more than electronic board games or computerized races."
67
Similarly, Judge Posner's decision in Kendrick noted in dicta that "if
the games [targeted by ordinance] lacked any story line and were
merely animated shooting galleries," government restriction "might
survive a constitutional challenge."6 And the U.S Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, in rejecting an attempt to hold video game
makers liable for a school shooting, stressed that "there are features of
video games which are not terribly communicative, such as the
manner in which the player controls the game," 69 and for this reason
stated that its decision "should not be interpreted as a broad holding
"70on the protected status of video games ....
The interest in such context-based tests is understandable:
since many physical games like table tennis, baseball, or chess have
not been considered protected First Amendment activity, 71 why should
the same activity count as speech when it happens to take an
electronic form? To be sure, courts have found some board games-
like Dungeons & Dragons-to constitute protected First Amendment
65. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
66. Id. at 181.
67. 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
68. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579-80 (7th Cir. 2001).
69. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002).
70. Id.
71. See e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep't of
Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D. N.Y. 1982); Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth
Access to Violent Video Games: Three Responses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 51, 102 (2003) [hereinafter Saunders, Regulating Youth Access] (arguing that
video games should be no more protected by the First Amendment than "baseball,
checkers, or tennis").
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activity, 72 but that may be because they have the narrative component
that many other games lack.73 Thus, it might seem sensible to draw a
First Amendment line between those games that convey a message, or
that involve narrative or role-playing, and those cruder games, the
design and challenges of which do not incorporate any such First
Amendment elements. This was precisely what the court in Wilson
tried to do, 74 when it sought to extend First Amendment protection to
complex, story-based games, but deny it to games that are simply
"digitized pinball machines."
75
Such a solution would help classify the First Amendment
status of games, both virtual and physical, along the lines of the
Supreme Court's rule in "the Spence test." Specifically, such a rule
would provide that games that communicate messages (or perhaps,
broadening the test a bit, that involve narratives) count as protected
First Amendment activity, and those lacking such expressive content
do not. But as appealing as use of the Spence test may be in this
context, it is ultimately a poor guide for which video games-or virtual
environments-should or should not receive First Amendment
protection. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized that
abstract art and music count as protected First Amendment speech
even though they lack the "particularized message" that the Spence
test treats as an essential and defining element of such speech.
76
What is true for non-narrative and non-representational painting and
music should be true also for non-narrative and non-representational
video games.
B. The First Amendment and Free-Form Video Games
Consider the following examples. Apart from Second Life,
which is often devoid of a narrative until its users wish to endow it
with one, there are numerous other video games that lack traditional
stories. This is arguably the case with the genre of "Zen gaming"
developed by thatgamecompany 77 and others through games like
72. See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 819, 821 (W.D. Ky. 1989).
73. See Morley, supra note 18, at 365 ("Of course, when a game expressly conveys a
particular idea, the First Amendment applies.")
74. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002).
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying note 53.
77. See About thatgamecompany, http://thatgamecompany.com/about/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009) (noting that the company's "goal is to make commercial video games that
communicate different emotional experiences [that] the current video game market is not
offering").
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Flower and flOw for the PlayStation 3. 78 Flower does have a plot and
task of sorts: the player "collect[s] petals by steering a gust of wind
through idyllic pastures" as she floats through the dreamscapes of
various flowers that can only be explored in the flowers' dreams since
they are, in actuality, confined to an apartment window sill. This is a
highly unusual game, since, as one review notes, "[Y]ou're encouraged
to lose yourself in this digitally created nirvana" and not simply to
focus on the goals of the game. 79 According to the same review, the
greatest reward of playing the game is not to win or achieve anything,
but to enjoy the remarkable visual and auditory qualities of the
environment: dreamscapes that range from "natural to psychedelic to
industrial" and the auditory experiences one can generate while
wandering.80 "Each petal," the review adds, "has a distinct audio cue,
be it a string instrument or chorus song, and creating beautiful waves
of sound is probably the greatest incentive for perfecting your path
through each level."81
Similar observations have been made about
thatgamecompany's previous release, flOw, where gainers devour
small sea creatures (and avoid being devoured by larger ones) to
create new, longer animals that look like a cross between strange
microscopic organisms and elements of a Paul Klee painting. As one
reviewer notes:
flOw has more in common with something like a lava lamp than an actual game.
It's something to be watched. You'll find yourself infinitely more intrigued by the
shapes and colors that evolve throughout its experience than its relatively scarce
gameplay mechanics. It's basically a piece of computer art that happens to be
controllable via the Sixaxis controller.
82
Although there are small traces of narrative in these games, it
seems odd to make any protected First Amendment status that they
might receive depend upon these narratives-especially given that the
experience that players may well find attractive has more to do with
78. See Posting of Stephen Totilo (Sony Introduces New Genre to Video Games .... )
to MTV Multiplayer Blog, http://multiplayerblog.mtv.com/2008/12/10/sony-introduces-new-
genre-to-video-games/ (Dec. 10, 2008, 14:30 EST) (noting that included in Sony's
announcement for the game Flower is the statement that "Zen gaming" is "the official
genre for the game"); see also Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games: Video Game Zen,
GAMASUTRA.COM, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/2585
/persuasive-gamesvideogame-zen.php ("Casual games inch closer to Zen because they
are abstract. These games ask the player to move cards or blocks or stones into patterns.").




82. Alex Navarro, flOw Review, GAMESPOT.COM, Feb. 22, 2007,
http://www.gamespot.com/ps3/puzzle/flow/review.html.
[Vol. 11:4:779
A FIRSTAMENDMENTFOR SECOND LIFE
simply enjoying colorful abstract forms and melodious sounds than
with any unfolding story or plot. The same is true of the game
Endless Ocean for Nintendo's Wii game console, a virtual seascape
where the player interacts with-and learns about-numerous virtual
sea creatures. As one reviewer states, "Although there are actually
plenty of tasks awaiting you in Endless Ocean, that's not really the
point. It feels as if the developer's goal was solely to create options
and then leave the choice of what you do and when you do it totally up
to you." 8 3
Indeed, the game of Electroplankton dispenses with even the
thin veneer of a narrative: "players" generate sequences of musical
tones by manipulating a visual environment that resembles a '"bizarre
petri dish-or perhaps a very musical aquarium-filled with different
species of plankton that can produce sound and light when you
interact with them."8 4  Game reviewers have expressed the same
doubts about calling this a "game" as they have about applying this
term to flOw or Endless Ocean:
To call Electroplankton a game would be a bit of a misnomer-there is no
competition, no objectives to be met, and no points to be scored. Rather, this new
project from self-proclaimed media artist Toshio Iwai is better described as a
collection of interactive multimedia art installations that you can take with you.8 5
To be sure, the artistic training, thought, and energy that has gone
into the design of these interactive art experiences goes far beyond8 6
that which is evident in games like Pong or other typical arcade-style
games. But the Supreme Court has shown great reluctance to make
protection for artistic work depend on evidence of artistic skill or
depth.8
7
83. Aaron Thomas, Endless Ocean Review, GAMESPOT.COM, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.gamespot.com/wii/adventure/foreverblue/review.html.
84. Ryan Davis, Electroplankton Review, GAMESPOT.COM, Jan. 6, 2006,
http://www.gamespot.com/ds/puzzle/electroplankton/review.html.
85. Id.
86. See e.g., Cocker, supra note 79 (describing the game Flower as "gorgeously
crafted" and noting that the "overall artistic quality.., really impresses").
87. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (stating that the "line between
the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to
draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all"); see also Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern
Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1375 (1990) (noting that "[elven
before the Post-Modern revolt in the arts, courts have long recognized that they are not
proper arbiters of artistic worth"); Saunders, Regulating Youth Access, supra note 71, at
100 ("[B]eing great literature is not a requirement for first amendment protection. The
written work of the worst hack novelist is just as protected as that of Nobel Prize
winners.").
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C. Possible Bases for Excluding Video Games from the First Amendment's
Scope: Human Communication vs. Commands to Machines
1. Why Commands to Machines Are Presumptively Non-Expressive
Thus, there seems to be little basis for excluding "digitized
pinball" or any other interactive graphics environment from the scope
of the First Amendment, regardless of crudity. Still, before discarding
the Spence test-or alternative tests that might deny First
Amendment protection to some virtual environments or video game
activities while allowing it for others-it is useful to consider a
number of alternatives. One such alternative is proposed by legal
scholar Kevin Saunders, who says that one must distinguish between
the game designers (whose game design does involve substantial
protected First Amendment activity) and the game players (whose
control of the game does not).88 He argues against classifying game-
playing as protected First Amendment speech because pressing
buttons or joysticks is not "person-to-person communication," which is
an essential element of protected First Amendment activity:
With an ordinary arcade video game, there is no one with whom the player can
communicate. It is only a machine, and while the programmer may communicate
to the player through the software, the player's actions do not communicate back to
the programmer but only to the program .... The multi-player video game ...
should be no more protected by the First Amendment than the . . .paint ball
exampleo or a game of baseball, checkers, or tennis. The only personal
interactions are simply moves of the game intended to win, rather than to convey
any message.
89
Saunders's analysis is quite similar to those that rely on the Spence
test, since it emphasizes the question of whether the interactions in
question "convey any message."90 But it can rather easily be restated
in a way that takes account of the exception that the Court made to
the Spence test in protecting non-representational art.91 In short,
Saunders's central argument against protecting video games is not
simply that they lack a message, but that they do not convey anything
88. See Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds--Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV. 187, 196
(2007) [hereinafter Saunders, Real Courts] ("It should be recognized that even for video
games, the program's game developer's rights are protected, as are the images the program
displays on the screen. Playing the video game, however, may be seen as another matter.
The player is not engaged in communication protected by the First Amendment but in
activity akin to playing a pinball machine.").
89. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access, supra note 71, at 102.
90. Id.
91. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995).
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to another person-even the sometimes indescribable feelings evoked
by music and abstract art.
Thus, the distinction that Saunders relies on is not between
actions that convey messages and actions that do not, but rather
between acts that communicate with human beings and acts that
"communicate" instructions to machines. This distinction certainly
has importance for First Amendment law, and is illustrated by the
following: when I would like my children to do something, such as put
away their toys or get ready for school, I ask them to do so. But when
I want an inanimate object, like a car, to do something, I must instead
set in motion a series of physical events, like turning on the ignition
and pressing the gas pedal. Unlike children, cars cannot understand
the meanings of words. Nor can they form emotional or intellectual
responses to non-verbal forms of expression, such as music or a
painting. As such, the orders or signals I give to a car will not be
protected First Amendment speech. Nor should such instructions to
machines automatically become "speech" when they are conveyed by
computers that make the communication more speech-like. For
example, if I can turn on a futuristic car by saying "start" to a voice-
recognition-equipped computer instead of turning an ignition lock, the
act would still not be a person-to-person communication protected by
the First Amendment. I am still providing orders to a machine that
can form no understanding of what I am saying, nor form any mental
impressions upon receiving the communication.
Saunders's key point, therefore, seems to be that the
commands that game players give to video-game consoles are simply
instructions to machines, not communications to other people. And
the fact that such machine-directed acts are encased within a story or
other work of art does not make them protected First Amendment
acts, just as the act of starting my car while dressed as James Bond
would not turn that action into protected speech.9 2 Moreover, physical
acts do not become protected communication because of the addition of
rules or players. Saunders says that, in baseball,
hitting the ball to the shortstop is not communicating to that player a message that
he or she should catch the ball and throw it to first.It is simply an event in the
game.The same is true for video games: the player does something that causes the
92. Saunders offers another example, noting that a house of prostitution would not
create First Amendment protection for itself merely by using "fantasy rooms," as "[tihe
existence of costumes, scenery, and scripts dotes] not change the fundamental nature of the
transaction, and the First Amendment should not serve to protect this otherwise regulable
activity." Saunders, Regulating Youth Access, supra note 71, at 101.
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program to respond in a certain way, but the player is not communicating with
anyone. 93
This characterization remains true in a multiplayer game, where, for
example, a player's virtual batter hits an electronic ball to the other
team's electronic shortstop.
94
Saunders takes a different position on virtual world activity.
In contrast to game players' non-communicative instructions to
machines, "there is a great deal of communication in virtual worlds,
[which] may be of great value. '95 Indeed, "there may be individuals
who find [that] they can communicate some ideas or issues better
through their virtual selves than in the real world," and "[i]t is
interactivity with others that gives virtual worlds value worthy of
First Amendment protection.
'96
2. Why Commands to Machines May Sometimes Be Expressive
But Saunders's distinction between the speech acts he finds in
virtual worlds like Second Life and the non-speech acts he finds in
video games-particularly the first-person shooter games that one can
play by oneself at home-is too simple. First, much of what people do
in virtual worlds is as non-communicative as what they do in a video
game. When I enter Second Life and press buttons, causing my avatar
to fly from one island to another, steer a submarine through the sea,
or hone my missile-firing skills by shooting spaceship lasers at nearby
targets, I am not communicating any more than I am in first-person
shooter games. 'Nor is it clear that players do so when they control
their avatars in virtual street fights or simulated sexual encounters.
Saunders does not clarify whether such non-communicative acts
receive First Amendment protection because they occur within a
certain medium-the virtual world-that allows for communication.
Making such a concession would raise the question of whether one
might similarly bequeath First Amendment protection to video games
by building in opportunities for textual, multiplayer interaction. And
if adding protected First Amendment elements to a virtual world or
video game can cast an aura that covers even non-communicative acts
in that environment, then why do the stories or other artistic elements
woven into video games not already cast such an aura?
One might conceivably respond to this inconsistency by
denying First Amendment protection to non-communicative acts in
93. See Saunders, Real Courts, supra note 88, at 199.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 201.
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virtual worlds as well as in video games. But it is not so simple to
classify all human-machine interactions as "non-expressive." First,
some of the acts we take to trigger routines by inanimate objects can
have a dual purpose: while they may function in one capacity as an act
directed at a machine, the same acts might simultaneously have a
human audience. We might, for example, send instructions to a car or
other machine not merely to make that device do something, but also
to show an audience how to operate it, in a training session for
example, or at a convention demonstrating automotive or other
technology.
This has been one of the major complexities faced by courts
deciding whether computer code for encrypting messages counts as
protected First Amendment speech.
Such code, say some judges and analysts, cannot count as
speech because it performs its primary function not when it is read or
understood by people, but when it triggers certain operations in a
computer. 97 But while computer code is designed to trigger actions in
machines, it can also be read, understood, and admired by
programmers and others who understand the language in which the
code is written. Indeed, when the U.S. government ordered
mathematics professor Daniel Bernstein to refrain from publishing
encryption code, he argued, in response to the claim that his code was
unprotected speech, that when publishing it he would not be giving
instructions to any machine but rather sharing his work with others
capable of reading and appreciating it.98 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit agreed, observing that "cryptographers use source
code to express their scientific ideas in much the same way that
mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs."99 This, it
might seem, is of little consequence to understanding the directions
that game players provide to machines through video game consoles or
attached joysticks, wheels, or guns. These gaming acts, after all, are
not expressed in language, but in movement. Still, as explained
below, gamers sometimes do record the display of these movements
97. See e.g., Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717-18 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev'd, 209
F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Because the expressive elements of encryption source code are
neither 'unmistakable' nor 'overwhelmingly apparent,' its export is not protected conduct
under the First Amendment."); Katherine A. Moerke, Note, Free Speech to a Machine?
Encryption Software Source Code is Not Constitutionally Protected "Speech" Under the First
Amendment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1007, 1048 (2000) ("Although people write source code in
languages and source code's use may implicate free speech values, it is not the protected
expression of an idea, but the unprotected implementation thereof.").
98. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1136, 1140 (9th
Cir. 1999), reh'g granted, opinion withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 1141.
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and post them for other gamers to see on websites such as YouTube or
WeGame. 00
There is also a second reason that we should not be too quick to
exclude instructions or triggering acts aimed at inanimate objects
from the ambit of First Amendment speech: some have to be protected
because they are essential components of, or support for, the method
by which we create expression aimed at human audiences. Thus,
when I press a button on my laptop keyboard or hit the send button on
an e-mail interface, I am giving instructions to a computer; I make the
computer to do what I want in the same way that I make my car or my
office light do what I want it to do. But the First Amendment-
protected communication I engage in when I send that e-mail would
not otherwise be possible. The same is true, of course, when I hit a
key on a piano in order to make it produce a particular sound, or when
I flip a switch on a movie projector to make it screen a film.
Artists and other individuals likewise create expression with
numerous other machines. Thus, even when a programmer does not
display her computer code for others to read-indeed, even when she
shrouds it in secrecy-the creation and running of that code might
nonetheless be part of an act of expression, creating computer
graphics or animations that are themselves protected First
Amendment speech. The code necessary for such expression would
likely include not only the programming language (such as C++ or
Java, which are intelligible to many computer experts) but also the
"machine code" (consisting of a combination of ones and zeros) that
can be acted upon by the computer itself.
None of this contradicts Saunders, who, as noted above, seems
willing to extend First Amendment protection to the programmed
instructions that video game designers create to make games
unfold.' 01 However, we should consider the possibility that it is not
only video game designers' instructions for machines that are
necessary for the expression that occurs in video games, but also those
provided by the players themselves. In this sense, a video game is like
many other examples of interactive art, depending upon interactions
not just between artists and audiences but also between the art-
producing machines and the participants. Consider, for example,
Myron Krueger's interactive art exhibit, Psychic Space, in which the
setting produced "automated human-machine experiences" where
people interacted with "a responsive environment."'' 0 2 As Krueger
100. See infra text accompanying note 111.
101. See supra text accompanying note 91.
102. MYRON K. KRUEGER, ARTIFICIAL REALITY II 24 (1991).
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explains, "pressure sensors ... detected participants' footsteps as they
moved around the room" and enabled a computer to respond to each
person's efforts "to walk through a maze," for example, by altering the
maze's path in response to particular moves. 103 The sensors also acted
as "the keyboard of a musical instrument that participants could play
by moving around the room." 104 In short, a person's interaction with
Krueger's art exhibit-like a player's interaction with a video game-
consisted of moves where contact with the machine would produce
changes in sound or imagery. Indeed, Krueger even draws the
analogy to video games and pinball himself: among other purposes, he
says, his "artificial realities" allow for creating "a game between the
computer and the participant. . . , an extension of the pinball machine
or the video game, the most commercially successful interactive
environments." 105
The example of interactive art installations underscores the
fact that human-machine interactions are not all the same for First
Amendment purposes. Some human-machine interactions, like
starting a car, are clearly non-speech acts (except perhaps when
starting the car is an integral part of a narrative such as a film
sequence, or another expressive activity, such as a parade). But
others, such as the instructions one gives by using a remote control to
select a DVD option or simply to change a television channel, or
instructions to a computer that musically modify a piece played back
by GarageBand, are difficult (if not impossible) to separate from an
audience's freedom to engage in artistic experience. Indeed, such
audience participation in art has become more and more common as
artistic work is increasingly viewed online or with the aid of computer
software that allows the viewer to digitally modify it. As Julie Cohen
writes, "Electronic text is dynamic; rather than following a single,
linear progression, the reader is free to choose his or her own path
through a network of linked material. Through this process, the
reader participates in the construction of the author's message."106
More and more, then, the First Amendment right to receive a writer's
or artist's information and ideas has a component that allows
recipients to transform that expression even as they are receiving it.
This is precisely what happens when a player uses an input device to
make the visual sequence in a video game unfold one way rather than
another.
103. Id. at 25-26, 27.
104. Id. at 30.
105. Id. at 87.
106. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1005 (1996).
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This facet of video games is underscored by the fact that video
games and virtual worlds often allow individuals not merely to
participate in a visual (and often auditory) experience, but also to very
easily create an animated film of that experience. 10 7 Second Life, for
example, allows virtual-world explorers to record every event on their
screens with one click of the mouse. Similarly, widely available
software allows them to record video game sequences, many of which,
as noted above, are routinely posted on websites like YouTube or
WeGame. 08  It would be a very strange First Amendment
jurisprudence that protected the right to create animated sequences
from scratch or with pre-loaded images on computer animation
software (like Adobe AfterEffects), but not similar animations created
by recording an adventure in Second Life or on a video game. 10 9 This
does not mean, of course, that every human activity-from driving to
playing a baseball game-is transformed into First Amendment
speech when it is recorded by a video camera. But when the
experience being recorded consists of the same imagery and sound as
the film recording it produces, then it is harder to resist the conclusion
that the underlying experience is as deserving of being called First
Amendment expression as the film created from it.
D. Possible Bases for Excluding Video Games
from the First Amendment's Scope II:
Social Convention and First Amendment Goals
Another possible way to make sense of video-game protection
in a world that protects non-representational art is to rely on the kind
of First Amendment framework that Robert Post offers for
distinguishing speech from non-speech. 110  According to Post's
argument, one cannot draw such a line by identifying essential
qualities that make certain actions "speech" or "non-speech" in the
107. These films created of, and from within, virtual worlds are often called
machinima. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 19, at 206-07; see also Balkin, supra note
35, at 2056 n.23 (noting that "there is already a nascent movie industry within virtual
worlds called machinima, in which people 'film' or make digital copies of what happens in
virtual worlds").
108. See Mark Hendrickson, WeGame Launches as YouTube for Garners,
TECHCRUNCH.COM, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.techcrunch.com2008/01/09/wegame-launches-
as-youtube-for-gamers/ (describing how WeGame "provides both the place and the tools for
gamers to share screencasts of their favorite in-game moments").
109. See Balkin, supra note 35, at 2055 ("The work of producing a new game is
increasingly similar to the work of putting together an animated motion picture-and the
same technologies are useful for both.").
110. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1250-60 (1995).
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abstract: some non-verbal acts, like holding a parade, count as speech,
while some verbal acts, like creating a binding contract with a
signature or filing a form required by the SEC, do not.11' Rather, Post
suggests that what matters in determining whether a certain form of
human activity should count as "speech" is whether it is part of a
social practice that, first, allows an audience to autonomously query a
communication or expression 12 and, second, furthers one or more of
the purposes that the Court attributes to the First Amendment. 1 3
This is a contextual inquiry and thus allows courts to provide case-by-
case determinations.
Video games certainly allow for autonomous reflection because
an individual can form her own reflections on the game designer's
work as she steers herself through it. Whether such games do or do
not contribute to First Amendment purposes is more debatable. But
one interesting consequence of Post's analysis is that once the medium
is recognized as deserving First Amendment protection, then all
instances of that medium should probably (at least presumptively)
receive First Amendment protection even if they do not, considered in
isolation, clearly serve the functions that originally justified counting
that medium as First Amendment speech.
Thus, he says, even an experimental movie that lacks a
storyline-that simply shows someone sleeping "for six continuous
hours"-should count as First Amendment speech simply by virtue of
the fact that it is a film. Any "sane court," he says, "would recognize
[it] as part of the genre of the cinema and entitled to First Amendment
status for that reason alone."1 1 4 This is because it is not merely the
watching of a particular movie, but the viewing of cinema as a social
practice more generally, that advances First Amendment purposes
and thus merits constitutional protection.
This theory provides at least one account for why non-
representational art that some audiences struggle to understand-for
example, Hans Richter's images of white squares and rectangles
floating against black backgrounds'" 5-might nonetheless count as
"speech." While such abstract art may well serve First Amendment
111. See id. at 1255.
112. See id. at 1254.
113. See id. at 1255.
114. Id. at 1253.
115. See Malcolm Turvey, Dada Between Heaven and Hell: Abstraction and
Universal Language in the Rhythm Films of Hans Richter, 105 OCTOBER, at 13, 31
(Summer 2003) (discussing Richter's film Rhythm 21 and noting that "the film's basic
elements" were "white figures (squares and rectangles) on a black background always
positioned perpendicular to the frame.").
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purposes in itself,116 even if it did not, it would be a part of and
embody a social medium-the medium of cinema that allows
individuals to view and understand stories, as well as a cryptic series
of abstract images.
Similarly, says Post, conventions about what constitutes art
can transform functional items that are not normally speech into a
component of it: "Thus while legal regulation of a urinal in a men's
bathroom would not bring the First Amendment into play, regulation
of exactly the same urinal in an art exhibition would. The difference
lies entirely in the existence of social conventions that create
constitutionally meaningful relationships.""17  In fact, a urinal did
become a protected work of sculpture when Marcel DuChamp placed
one in a museum and signed it.118
With such a model for how we define the contours of speech,
courts might well find that video games-with adventures scripted by
film writers such as the Wachowski brothers 19 or novelists like Clive
Barker' 20-cannot easily be distinguished from already-protected
works like films or comics in regards to the First Amendment value
they offer. Other video games, like Pong, Pacman, and
Electroplankton, would then receive First Amendment protection from
their membership in the same artistic medium as the story-driven
video games they resemble, even if they would not clearly qualify as
First Amendment "speech" when considered in isolation.
One problem with this model, however, is that it seems to
require either significant leeway for judicial judgment calls, or
substantial patience (and hope) for the evolution of social conventions
that are clear enough to reduce that leeway. The decision as to
whether a particular social practice serves First Amendment
116. For example, those purposes could be served by defying cultural orthodoxies
and thus prompting individuals to question governmental or other authority or by
promoting the self-development or fulfillment of audiences. See id. at 28 (describing
Richter's Dadaist films as part of a "critique of modernity."); see also Rodney A. Smolla,
Free Speech in an Open Society, at 5-17 (1992) (listing purposes attributed to the First
Amendment, including the advancing democratic deliberation, discovery of truth, and
autonomy or self-fulfillment).
117. Id. at 1254.
118. See id. at 1253-54.
119. See Matrix Game Aims to Set New Standard, BBC NEWS, May 13, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/3021461.stm (noting that for the Enter the Matrix
video game, the Wachowski brothers "wrote the script, directed the action, and provided
complete access to the entire film production").
120. See Ben Silverman, Authoring Games: Best Selling Authors Take a Novel
Approach to Game Design, YAHOO! GAMES, Aug. 4, 2008,
http://videogames.yahoo.com/feature/authoring-games/1201954 (noting that for Clive
Barker's Undying, Barker "was closely involved in the game's production, acting as a script
consultant").
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purposes, for example, is likely to be a highly debatable one, especially
given the wide disagreement among scholars and jurists about what
those purposes are. 121 Similarly, the question of whether two works of
interactive art, or two visual experiences, are part of the same
medium or social practice, rather than similar-looking instances of
different practices, might well depend upon the eye of the beholder.
It is possible that social conventions will provide clear answers
to these questions, as they have in the past-for example, by making
it hard to deny that an abstract film is still a film. 122 But it is harder
to say whether the plethora of video games and virtual worlds are part
of one medium or multiple different media. New developments in
computer graphics have now given rise to a dizzying variety of
computer-generated visual environments, and it is not clear whether
they all seem to be part of a single medium simply because of our
limited capacity to describe them, relying on single words or phrases
like "virtual world," "game," "app," or "application." Nor is this
question answered by the fact that we increasingly use the same
machine, namely a computer of some kind, to generate such visual
experiences. The computer, after all, is now a device we use to
experience many different forms of entertainment-music, film and
television, crossword puzzles, video games, virtual worlds, or just
collectively creating and enjoying art on social networking and video-
posting sites. The small computers and web browsers in smart phones
add old-fashioned voice communication to this list.
Thus, before deciding whether an abstract video game can
piggyback on the First Amendment protection already extended to
story-telling video games, we must overcome a difficult preliminary
inquiry: is it really a video game at all or it something entirely
different? What, for example, does one do with Electroplankton, or
with Endless Ocean, or the virtual flights one might take over the
computer-simulated cities of Google Earth?
Are these all video games? Or might one, as some courts seem
to propose,123 treat the playing of simple arcade games as a
fundamentally different social practice from the more movie-like
experience of immersing oneself in a graphically rich adventure game?
121. See e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-6 (2d ed. 2002)
(discussing different theories of the First Amendment's purpose); see also id. at 6-7 (noting
that arguments attempting to focus on a particular value "never seemed to persuade many
other scholars and were almost entirely ignored by the courts").
122. But see Adler, supra note 87, at 1378 (rejecting any attempt to judicially define
"art" because '[a]rt,' by its nature, will call into question any definition that we ascribe to
it[, and a]s soon as we put up a boundary, an artist will violate it, because that is what
artists do") (alteration in original).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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Might one likewise exclude from the social practice of video game-
playing those virtual leisure activities that have a possible functional
component-like the exploration of virtual New York and Paris
landmarks on Google Earth 3D buildings layer,124 or the use of a
virtual driving or shooting range that is intended to develop one's
skills in performing the real-life equivalent?
E. Another More Expansive Model of First Amendment Protection
for Video Games and Virtual Worlds
Faced with such questions, the best approach to understanding
the First Amendment status of virtual worlds and video games is to
begin with a presumption that applies not to a discrete social practice
or narrowly defined artistic medium, but to a broad swath of human
experience. In short, as suggested earlier,' 25 where visual imagery on
an electronic screen is meant simply for people to perceive, reflect
upon, enjoy, or creatively alter, it should, like a drawing or painting on
paper, be seen as First Amendment speech. This conclusion results
from an overlap of two more general observations central to First
Amendment theory. First, as Paul Salamanca has written, a central
element of First Amendment tradition and jurisprudence is to mark
out those spaces where human action can be free from legal
restriction, even in a highly regulated modern society and economy.
126
Second, apart from looking at the (broadly defined) media that provide
raw material for the exercise of human imagination, we should also
consider the most important First Amendment criteria for identifying
and marking out this space for free imaginative activity, a variant of
John Stuart Mill's harm principle.127 This principle provides that
where a certain kind of activity does not cause direct harm to persons
or property, it should be shielded from government regulation or
restraint.128 As Lee Bollinger notes, this generalization about likely
harms is one of the best explanations for why First Amendment
speech (however one defines it) is distinguished from other conduct
and singled out for special insulation from government: it is because
124. See New 3D Cities Roundup for Google Earth, Google Earth Blog, Dec. 29, 2008,
http:lwww.gearthblog.comlbloglarchives/2008/12/new 3d-citiesroundup-for-google-ea.ht
ml.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
126. See Salamanca supra note 55, at 198.
127. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed.,
1991) (1869) ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.").
128. See id.
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this type of activity "generally causes less individual and social injury
than does nonspeech behavior."
129
This is not to say that this framework can explain all of First
Amendment law. Indeed, where verbal communication is at issue,
free speech protection will often presumptively apply as a general
matter even where direct harm arises from such communication. But
for solitary non-verbal expression, First Amendment jurisprudence
has largely (and appropriately) moved toward a framework where
almost all visual or musical creative activity counts as speech as long
as it is in a medium-like a canvas or an electronic screen-that is
merely seen or heard, and rarely felt in the form of physical injury or
loss of resources. 130 Such an approach spares courts the task of asking
whether a certain set of images, or means of altering them, is
"communicative" enough to count as speech, or has enough artistic or
intellectual value to deserve First Amendment protection.
How then do we answer the charge made by courts and
scholars that some (if not all) video games are indistinguishable from
the unprotected non-speech acts of playing pinball, or chess, or
another type of board game? We might perhaps present an account of
why a game of pinball played on a phantom machine, or a game of
chess played on a virtual board, is less likely to disrupt others' lives
than the physical variants of these games. But a more persuasive-
and perfectly plausible-response is to abandon the mission of
distinguishing them and instead argue that courts were wrong to
assume that mechanical arcade games and board games are outside of
the First Amendment's scope. After all, if enjoying the movement of
electronically produced images is a protected First Amendment
activity, why not the movements and patterns of mechanically
triggered light and sound (in a pinball game) or of wooden figures
moved over a wooden board (in a chess game) as well? Unlike football,
boxing, or race car driving, these are not activities that are likely to
threaten physical damage to people or structures. And once we put
129. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 124 (1986).
130. This, at least, is one conclusion one can plausibly draw from the Court's
decision in Stanley v. Georgia that it the "State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969). While this staunch protection for in-home activity is limited to exercise of freedom
of thought and speech, it is not clear on what basis the Court could convincingly exclude
harm-free solitary activity, given it now neither demands the presence of a discernable
message in such activity, see supra text accompanying notes 46-50, and does not demand
that the activity satisfy any criterion of artistic merit. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in
Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 1141, 1171-1178 (2008).
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aside the Spence test's untenable requirement of finding
communications, messages, or narratives, then it is hard to justify
classifying a private game of solitaire as any less expressive than the
creation of a house of cards, a collage, or a diorama.
This vision of the First Amendment's application to video
games and virtual worlds is similar to that which Daniel Wachtell
very recently proposed when he argued that, since there is no coherent
or consistent way to distinguish expressive and non-expressive
conduct, courts should adopt "an expansive definition of speech
coextensive with the limits of (free) human agency." 131  More
specifically, says Wachtell, if an individual's actions are free from
harm (or the threat of harm) that gives rise to tort liability-"typically
intrusions upon bodily integrity and economic interests"-then the
First Amendment should shield it from restriction. 132 This vision of
the First Amendment as encompassing all harm-free activity might be
difficult to adhere to in the public sphere. In regulating our public
interactions, after all, the government does not merely protect us from
injury but also takes on the role of coordinating and shaping
communal affairs in numerous ways-for example, by establishing
and setting ground rules for collective economic and social activity in
areas as diverse as stock market transactions, use of transportation
routes and technologies, and construction of buildings and
communication infrastructure. However, the proposal has more
intuitive power with respect to our actions in private dens, living
rooms, and electronic spaces. In these private realms, it is hard to see
why the First Amendment should protect only creative expression of,
or elaboration of, our thoughts when they take the form of a
conventional artistic project like a painting and not a set of cryptic pen
marks, computer graphics, or rule-based manipulations of cards and
chess pieces.
133
By pushing us to think more seriously about this expansive
First Amendment protection for harm-free creativity and play, virtual
environments-and their narrative and message-free experiences-
help us not only define the First Amendment's future, but also rethink
the theoretical vision that has dominated its past.
They also help us prepare for the legal future of gaming: while
cases in the first decade of the twenty-first century have focused on
narrative video games that have moved away from and beyond the
131. Daniel F. Wachtell, Note, No Harm, No Foul: Reconceptualizing Free Speech
Via Tort Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 950 (2008).
132. Id.
133. See Blitz, supra note 130, at 1177-1178.
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"earl[ier] generation of video games" that were "little more than
electronic board games or computerized races," 134 "animated shooting
galleries,"1 35 or "digitized pinball machines,"' 36 it is a mistake to
dismiss such visually abstract and storyless games as part of an era
gone by. People continue to play them on devices like iPhones and
iPods, as well as on networks like Facebook. They create games for
others and enjoy those games themselves when they drive a virtual
vehicle, play a fantastic electronic instrument, or float through a
strange geometric pattern in Second Life. If anything, the emergence
of smart phones and easily created (and transferred) web-based
applications has made these simple, storyless games more common
and interactive, allowing individuals to modify the virtual space they
inhabit. 3
7
II. VIRTUAL WORLDS WITHOUT BORDERS
Although courts were reluctant to protect the isolated,
storyless, and crude graphic experience in "[t]he earl[ier] generation of
134. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
135. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579-80 (7th Cir. 2001).
136. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002).
137. Of course, even where video games constitute speech, one might be able to
argue they should nonetheless be regulated because of the potential harm they cause to
minors where they encourage, or train them in, violence. Thus, Kevin Saunders and other
scholars, as well as some courts, have also dedicated significant attention to the question of
whether-if video games are conceded to be speech-they might be low-value speech of a
kind that the government might regulate as to minors without satisfying strict scrutiny.
See e.g., Saunders supra note 88, at 77 ("A properly drawn, narrowly framed statute
restricting access by children to violent video games should meet strict scrutiny."); see also
Laughlin supra note 56, at 519-45.
Indeed, the most recent federal case to address the constitutionality of video
games focused almost entirely on this issue. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 07-16620 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2009), available at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/02/20/0716620.pdf (considering, and
rejecting, California's argument that courts assessing First Amendment status of violent
video games "should not apply strict scrutiny and instead should apply a 'variable
obscenity' standard from Ginsberg v. New York") (internal citation omitted). I do not
address these arguments here, except to note that once one recognizes that video games are
expression of the kind one finds in movies, books, and comic books, the state must either
take on the task of restricting violent imagery in all of these media as to minors or explain
why it is that video games should be subject to such regulation while other media, such as
movie that may contain more realistic violent imagery, are not. See Am. Amusement Mach.
Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Violent video games played in public
places are a tiny fraction of the media violence to which modern American children are
exposed. Tiny-and judging from the record of this case not very violent compared to what
is available to children on television and in movie theaters today.").
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video games,"138 and sometimes still express reluctance, such
protection is, in at least one respect, less troublesome and problematic
than First Amendment protection for the modern-day equivalents in
virtual worlds: the simulated wanderings in which individuals engage
in virtual worlds like Second Life and World of Warcraft do not occur
on a privately owned video game console or an arcade machine that
can be used by only one or two gainers at a time. Rather, they occur in
electronic territory that is shared with millions of others-almost all
strangers-and run from a far-away server by the game designers (or
"game gods"). Moreover, the space on the web or elsewhere in virtual
space is not inevitably reserved for pure expression, play, or artistry:
it can potentially interact with, control, or compromise information
about our lives elsewhere online-for example, realms in which we
keep confidential personal information, such as credit card
information, or engage in commercial or other practical activity. And
even where a world like Second Life does not interface with other web-
based environments, the activity it consists of is more than mere
sound and imagery. People bring to virtual world platforms some
practical concerns as well: they engage in money-making, advertising
and promotion, education, business conferences, and numerous other
activities. This makes it hard to view such virtual environments as
the pure First Amendment realms described above.
How should First Amendment analyses respond to this
borderlessness? Should courts continue to classify as "speech" even
those virtual actions that have functional uses? Should they classify
as First Amendment activity-strongly insulated from government
regulation-even those virtual world acts that cost or earn people real
money or spill over into real-world jobs, projects, or data-archives?
And if virtual worlds are not merely places where we express
ourselves artistically, but spaces-much like real neighborhoods-
where we work, live, and receive information about the world, then
should they not be treated like public towns subject to the
constitutional rules that prevent governments from abusing their
power?
A. Virtual Worlds as Company Towns
Some commentators have argued that they should, and draw
upon the Supreme Court case of Marsh v. Alabama.139 In this case,
Chickasaw, Alabama, a company town operated by the Gulf
138. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
139. 326 U.S. 501 (1945).
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Shipbuilding Corporation for its employees, tried to exclude from its
streets a proselytizer from the Jehovah's Witnesses, who wished to
distribute religious literature on a street corner within the town. 140
When she refused to leave, the town authorities arrested her and she
was subsequently charged, in Alabama state court, with criminal
trespass-on the grounds that she had remained in the town's
"private" property after having been asked to leave. The Supreme
Court, however, found that the town's actions violated the First
Amendment.141 It found an exception to the constitutional principle
that only state actors are subject to constitutional limits like the First
Amendment: although the corporation that made rules for, and ran,
the town of Chickasaw was a private entity, the rules it made to
govern use of the town's streets and public spaces were rules of a kind
normally made by government. In other words, the corporation was
performing "public function [s]. '"142 The court thus rejected the
argument that the streets were private property where the company
could censor or exclude people without regard to the First
Amendment. 1
43
The same, says Peter S. Jenkins, should apply to the electronic
streets and spaces of virtual worlds that will "in the future become
inextricably intertwined with the fabric of our daily lives."1 44 Dan
Hunter and Gregory Lastowka also argue that "[i]f constitutional
speech protection extends to company towns . . ., it seems likely that
such rights will be asserted by, and eventually granted to those who
live in virtual worlds."' 4
Treating virtual worlds as company towns solves some of the
problems that arise from the blurring of game world and real world
domains: government authorities may not arbitrarily take away
people's property or liberty without due process of law, and they may
not discriminate in favor of some residents and against others without
clearing certain constitutional hurdles. Additionally, treating virtual
worlds as company towns may at first seem to help deal not only with
virtual worlds' role in providing individuals with concrete goods, but
also in securing their role as realms for free expression. Indeed,
company town status may at first seem essential for promoting First
140. See id. at 502-503.
141. See id. at 504.
142. See id. at 506.
143. Id.
144. Peter S. Jenkins, The Virtual World as a Company Town: Freedom of Speech in
Massively Multiple Online Role Playing Games, 8 J. INTERNET L. 1, 8 (2004).
145. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 72 (2004).
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Amendment freedom in such environments-since censorship of in-
world speech has thus far been imposed not by government attempts
to restrict that speech, but by Internet companies responding to
players' criticisms or protests.
146
However, treating virtual worlds as company towns is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, as Hunter and Lastowka
point out, doing so undercuts the expressive freedom of game
designers. 147 They consider the possibility that imposing democratic
rights and liberties on virtual worlds might nonetheless be an
acceptable legal measure, since an appropriate legal regime would
secure the right of not only the game gods, but also of participants, to
design and shape their worlds.148 The problem is that treating virtual
worlds as company towns would limit these participants' rights of
speech and association as well: individual players who wished to join
with a game designer in establishing a private online theocracy would
not be permitted to do so, since such a virtual regime would run afoul
of First Amendment rights for would-be dissenters. Second, the
expression and role-play possible in company towns may also be
limited in other respects by constitutional requirements: the design
and experience of virtual worlds might be limited by procedural due
process requirements, for example, or by equal protection
requirements that might constrain the ways that virtual worlds
choose to govern themselves.
This is not to deny that arbitrariness by game gods can be
harmful to virtual world participants-but its harmfulness is more
comparable to that of an arbitrary employer, home association, private
school authority, or other private government than that of public
authorities. While the option of exit from the virtual world may be
painful (as it is in an employment context), it remains available. It is
not the case, as it was in the Alabama town in Marsh,149 that those
who run virtual neighborhoods can drive speech from all of the public
places in which town residents walk or drive, since virtual world
residents may also encounter speech in physical streets and parks,
and can organize protests against virtual world operators in those
locations, in newspapers, and in other sites on the web.
While it is not the case today, it is possible that a mega-virtual
world of the future would become a de facto public entity. Jenkins
146. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 144.
147. Lastowka and Hunter, supra note 145, at 61 (Virtual world creators and
operators "may have their own free speech arguments to assert against those who accuse
them of censorship.")
148. Id.
149. Marsh, supra note 139, at 508.
[Vol. 11:4:779
A FIRSTAMENDMENTFOR SECOND LIFE
imagines precisely such a world where a "new virtual earth" swallows
or displaces the diverse "virtual mini-worlds" in existence today and
where someone exiled from it would be in the position of someone
barred from using the Internet, the phone lines, or another key
communication technology. 150 Obviously, such an electronic monopoly
would necessarily be subject to far greater government oversight than
one virtual world among many, but it seems premature to govern
existing virtual worlds as though they were inchoate versions of such
a future monopoly.
B. Government Regulation in Virtual Worlds
Still, even if virtual worlds are not governments, events within
them often concern government-and this poses a challenge for First
Amendment analyses. As Jack Balkin notes, virtual worlds are not
strongly insulated from interaction with the outside world: "the
boundaries between the game space and real space are permeable[,
and t]hings that happen to people in the game space can have real-
world effects both on them and on other people who are not in the
game space." 151 For Balkin and for many others, the single most
significant example of this breach in the boundary between real and
game space consists in the "commodification" of virtual objects-that
is, the appearance in virtual worlds of "items of value easily
convertible into real-world property." 152 Where virtual currency is
convertible into real currency, it can be used in commercial exchanges,
in gambling, or in laundering-all activities that serve precisely the
same functions when they occur inside and outside of virtual space. 153
How can the state follow and regulate such economic activity if it
takes the form of non-regulable artistic expression in virtual worlds?
Balkin suggests a framework that separates the commercial element
of the world from the artistic element of it, and suggests that it is
largely up to game designers to determine what kind of virtual
environment they want to create: "Treat the players as artists, and the
law will look on your world as a collective work of art. Treat the
players as consumers, and they will demand consumer protection."'154
Thus, much will depend on the specific rules that game designers
build into the computer code for their virtual games, and the behavior
rules they specify in the end-user license agreements (EULAs) into
150. See Jenkins, supra note 144, at 8.
151. Balkin, supra note 35 at 2059.
152. Id. at 2060.
153. See id. at 2060-61.
154. Id. at 2073.
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which players must generally contract in order to be participants in
these virtual worlds.
This strategy for distinguishing expressive and functional
aspects of virtual worlds tracks a strategy that has been used, or
advocated, elsewhere by First Amendment scholars. 155  Without
rejecting the utility of making such a distinction between expressive
and functional qualities, courts and scholars need to go further. After
all, many works of art have functions that go beyond informing or
evoking emotions in a particular audience: a lighted sculpture, for
example, can simultaneously provide more light in a room or a park; a
book of maps and architectural landmarks can serve as a tool for
navigating a neighborhood or a highway; and paintings or
photographs can serve as thumbnail icons to distinguish particular
files or folders-on a computer or in a drawer. The fact that certain
acts of expression serve functions that might just as easily be
performed by non-speech acts or non-expressive objects does not
automatically remove the First Amendment's shielding of these
functions. Rather, to the extent that the state is allowed to regulate
the functional aspects of expressive activity, it must be because there
are particular interests that the state must serve in doing so. Rather
than simply asking whether the imagery in virtual worlds has a
functional quality, courts and lawmakers should thus ask what harms
would arise from leaving it unregulated (and treating it as
unregulable) by the state.
1. Addressing Virtual World Privacy
Consider how such an inquiry might guide us as we deal with a
thorny problem raised by the real world effects of virtual worlds:
effects on the privacy of information. The privacy problem arises
because, while virtual worlds are spaces in the public world outside
the home, they are also places where people seek privacy. People seek
not only to express themselves in virtual worlds, but also to hide
155. See e.g., Janet Elizabeth Haws, Comment, Architecture as Art? Not in My
Neocolonial Neighborhood: A Case for Providing First Amendment Protection to Expressive
Residential Architecture, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1625, 1646 (arguing that while "buildings
might be so clearly functional and devoid of expressive elements... that they fall outside
the scope of First Amendment protection," the First Amendment should protect
"expressive, artistic architecture"); Thomas Pak, Note, Free Exercise, Free Expression and
Landmarks Preservation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1813, 1833 (1991) (arguing that buildings
should not be protected when their builders' or owners' "motives are primarily functional,"
but should be when they are expressive); cf. Genevieve Blake, Comment, Expressive
Merchandise and the First Amendment in Public Fora, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049, 1053-
61 (2007) (noting how courts have made an inquiry in whether street merchandise sold as
art is primarily expressive or functional).
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themselves there. As Kevin Saunders observes, some of the people
who look for interaction in virtual worlds do so because they "find
[that] they can communicate some ideas or issues better through their
virtual selves than in the real world," perhaps in part because virtual
worlds provide them with the chance to speak from behind the
pseudonymous identity of their avatar.156
Nor is it only private communication that people seek in virtual
worlds, but also private activity, perhaps even isolation. As Joshua
Fairfield writes, the "anonymity of novel online environments has
caused people to move their intimate lives online," with the odd result
being that this drive for increased privacy only moves these private
events into an environment that, given its digital nature, can be far
more easily and completely surveyed and recorded than private
environments in physical space. 157 He also notes that "The denizens of
virtual worlds are constantly under surveillance by 'game gods,' the
private companies that design, maintain, and administer virtual
worlds. The game gods then must comply with government requests
for call details, wiretaps, stored chat logs, and other business
records." 158 Thus, Fairfield understandably calls for greater privacy
protection for virtual activity. However, strong First Amendment
safeguards may make at least some kinds of privacy protection more
difficult. If the game gods wish to design and run a virtual
environment where surveillance is a constant possibility, First
Amendment protection does in some ways make it harder to stop
them.
2. Virtual World Privacy vs. Freedom
of Virtual Design and Exploration
To the extent that the First Amendment includes a freedom to
design virtual worlds and video games, it seems to encompass a
freedom for worlds to be transparent and easily supervised. Likewise,
if the programming of virtual objects in these worlds is a protected
activity, then what remedy is there when individuals design objects
that not only fly or move a certain way in response to joystick
commands, but also gather audio or video footage, or even other data,
156. Saunders, Real Courts, supra note 88, at 201.
157. Joshua Fairfield, Escape into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the
Surveillance Society, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 131, 134 (2009), available at
http://thepocketpart.org/2009/0i/19/fairfield.html. For another discussion and analysis of
privacy in virtual worlds, see generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Information Privacy in Virtual
Worlds: Identifying Unique Concerns Beyond the Online and Offline Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH
REV. 231.
158. Id. at 132.
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from unsuspecting residents of Second Life? What remedy, for
example, might people have against in-world drones, parabolic
microphones, or virtual reproductions of the "extendable ear" or
"invisibility cloak" that are used by denizens of Harry Potter's world to
listen in on others' conversations? Objects of this sort are already on
sale at spy shops in Second Life. 159 If the state wished to regulate
such in-world spying, or at least make it more obvious to those who
might be its victims, would the First Amendment act as a barrier?
This depends in part on what the First Amendment protects
when it protects the computer coding or scripting that makes virtual
worlds behave the way they do. For some scripts-like those that
cause observable in-world action-the answer would probably be
relatively simple. Such scripts should generally count as First
Amendment speech for the same reason that a video game designer's
program counts as speech: because of the artistic creation it makes
possible. However, it is less clear that the answer would be the same
for scripts that do not merely order the computer to display
something, but order it to be invisible and silently take or store digital
information, regardless of whether that information is something of
value (monetary or otherwise) or private information belonging to
other participants. Consider a scenario where a sculpture or diorama
purchased by a private collector contains, artfully built into it, a
hidden camera that, unbeknownst to the collector, transmits video or
audio recordings of his home to another location. 160 A court would
likely consider the camera as an example of invasion of privacy. So it
arguably makes sense to draw the same conclusion about virtual
environments that contain hidden forms of surveillance of in-world
activity.
But to the extent that such privacy violations justify any kind
of state intervention, it is not because they work invisibly or because
they are "functional" rather than "expressive." First, even if the
collection of information does not manifest itself through on-screen
movements or sounds, this fact does not necessarily mean that is
outside of, or separate from, the artistic and creative expression that
159. See e.g., W. James Au, Spy Game, NEW WORLD NOTES, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2007/02/spy-game.html (stating that while Second Life's
"Community Standards" forbid listening in on others' conversations without consent,
"[s]urveillance devices are not uncommon in Second Life, often used by Residents to spy on
their virtual world lovers, if they suspect they're being unfaithful. [These] devices are
widely sold, in-world and on the web, through [Second Life] e-commerce sites. Buy one,
hide... it in the right place, and your chat log will include a handy copy of what everyone
within listening distance of the bug says").
160. This is true, for example, of one of the objects that the protagonist unknowingly
has placed in his home in the movie The Game. See THE GAME, supra note 1.
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occurs in a virtual world. There are situations in which surveillance
might be integral to the artistic experience itself and not a separate
function. The interactive installation "Metaplay" of virtual reality
desiger and artist, Myron Krueger, for example, involved video
observation of participants by an invisible artist, who would then
sketch them on video displays. 161 In "Vetaplay," the participant soon
became aware of this surveillance, but in other contexts, the
surveillance might be-and perhaps should be-more mysterious.
Where a video game or virtual world includes spying and surveillance
as a central component of its challenge or narrative, it might be
impossible to isolate that invasion of privacy. The use of spying
drones or bionic ears might also allow individuals to create movies or
pictures of a kind that would be impossible if they could not use such
objects. 162 And the activity that such drones or bionic ears engage in-
gathering of expressive sound or imagery created, or enabled, by
virtual world designers-is arguably activity of a kind long protected
in First Amendment jurisprudence: the receipt of information and
ideas. 16
3
To the extent that such information should nonetheless be
subject to any invasion of privacy laws, this is not because of
functionality in virtual spying devices, but because of the type and
degree of the harms they threaten-especially when they happen
contrary to the expectations of game players (relying on the game
designers' assurances) about the kind of privacy they can find in a
virtual world.
The state has for over a century now played a role in assuring
that individuals are not subject to observation or intrusion in
environments where they are led to believe they can engage in
sheltered reading or intimate activity, or can engage in solitary review
of sensitive personal or business information. It is for this reason that
the state probably should be able to require that virtual world
operators clearly inform would-be players about the privacy regimes in
their worlds, and perhaps require privacy-protective regimes as a
161. KRUEGER, supra note 102, at 18-24.
162. This may have been true of the experience in which the protagonist immerses
himself in the movie The Game, where very sophisticated surveillance is arguably a part of
the drama he seeks to enter into at the beginning of the film. See THE GAME, supra note 1.
163. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas"). One might argue that since freedom of
speech - and "the right to receive information that it entails" - "presupposes a willing
speaker," Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756 (1976), individuals exploring Second Life or other virtual worlds should not have a
right to create records of communications, or artistic expression, that has been created for
other audiences- but not willingly provided to them.
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default. To the extent that the expressive action of game designers or
players in virtual worlds is subject to legal restriction or regulation, it
is not because we (or state officials) can discover non-expressive
components within virtual world experiences, but because those




Video games have quickly-in the past eight years-found a
secure place in the realm of protected First Amendment expression.
They have done so largely by becoming less and less like pinball
machines and board games, and more and more like movies: they are
often woven around stories created by scriptwriters and feature
appearances by actors. But while video games' impressive evolution
164. As a practical matter, this will probably make it so that, if the government
wishes to regulate virtual world expressions with real-world implications, it will often have
to satisfy the O'Brien test to do so. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (setting
out a four-part test for regulating symbolic conduct on the basis of its non-expressive
qualities, allowing government regulation of this kind when it is "[1] within the
constitutional power of the Government. . . [2] furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest [3] [that is] unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and [4] if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."). The O'Brien test is the test that the
Supreme Court has used for symbolic conduct, but courts have also used it in other
circumstances where, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently said, the
government restricts speech under a "content-neutral regulation with an incidental effect
on a speech component." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454 (2d Cir.
2001). Thus, in Corley, the Second Circuit followed the District Court case it was reviewing
in using the O'Brien test to analyze an injunction, under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), banning dissemination of computer code that could be used to circumvent
copyright protection software on DVD movies. See id. at 442 (noting that the District Court
had found that because the DMCA regulates the "functional" aspect of the code, it is not
strict scrutiny, but rather "the intermediate scrutiny of United States v. O'Brien [that]
applies]. See also id. at 450, 454 (reiterating the O'Brien test's four prongs and using them
to assess the constitutionality of the DMCA injunction) (citation omitted). Ultimately, after
applying the O'Brient test, it found, the DMCA-based injunction was a permissible content-
neutral regulation under the First Amendment.
Some scholars have recently criticized the court for weakening the O'Brien test
(as well as the time, place, and manner test with which the Court has equated it). See e.g.,
Post supra note 110. But the language of the O'Brien test seems designed to, and could,
require the government to regulate activity mixing speech and non-speech only where it
can show that doing so is necessary to address a harm of the kind that it is government's
responsibility to address (if courts require such a showing in requiring that government be
pursuing "substantial government interest"). See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (requiring, inter
alia, that government show it has pursuing a "substantial government interest . ..
unrelated to the suppression of free expression" even when its speech regulation is content-
neutral). Using the O'Brien test in this way over a series of cases may help define what
kind of harms possibly arising out of virtual worlds should be considered harms that the
government may regulate, despite such regulation's impact on some virtual world speech.
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has made it easier for courts to give them First Amendment
protection, it has come at the cost of leaving courts and scholars more
confused about the electronic media that they evolved away from-
media that consists not of action-packed adventures marked by
stunning special effects, but of simpler games that involve "digitized
pinball machines" or "animated shooting galleries." Courts had
previously refused to give these simpler arcade-style games First
Amendment status, perhaps because doing so seemed to open the door
to extending First Amendment protection not just to computer games,
but also to games more generally-and perhaps even further.
Fortunately, certain aspects of emerging virtual worlds give us
reason to revisit this legally abandoned cultural landscape: some
virtual worlds (and other electronic territories) leave individuals to
write their own stories and scripts, or to forego this option and simply
play digitized pinball or poker, build and float over abstract forms, or
engage in simulated sex and violence. People are left free to sculpt
their own lives in Second Life, for example. They spend substantial
amounts of time on computers and iPhones enjoying games--or very
ungamelike "video games" that fail to give them a plot or a challenge
but rather provide intriguing imagery or soundscapes. All of this
should be staunchly protected by the First Amendment when it is
conducted in private environments, walled off from the social worlds.
Furthermore, it should continue to receive some (albeit lesser) First
Amendment protection even as these walls are lowered and
individuals take advantage of the open-endedness and plasticity of
modern virtual environments and bring real-life business into artistic
settings that might previously have been reserved for creativity or
recreation. Such settings offer a refuge of sorts from the regulated
world where physical and economic harm is present, and where the
state is charged with vigilantly protecting us from it. These are places
where people have freedom to give visual, aural, and other vivid form
to their imaginations-or at least enter, interact with, and transform
the environments that others have sculpted-and where such freedom
should be preserved to the greatest extent possible with the aid of
First Amendment armor. Providing such protection to creative
environments requires that courts stop reserving it only for exchanges
where they can find a message to be understood, a lesson to be
learned, or a story to be heard. It requires them to more broadly
cordon off from state control electronic and other spaces that can
provide hospitable terrain for the exercise of imagination.
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